Abstmcf-The rising threat of cyher attacks, especially distributed denial-of-senice @Dos), make the IP lhceback probIem very relevant to today's Internet security. IP lhceback is one of the security problems pssoeiated with identifying the source of the attack packets. This work presents a novel approach to IP lhceback ~ Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM). The proposed approach is Jealable, simple to implement, and introduces no bandwidth and practically no processing overhead on the network equipment It is capable of tracing thousands of simultaneous attackers during DDOS attack. AU of the processing is done at the victim. The traceback pmeess can be performed post-mortem, which allom for tracing the attadw that m a y not have been noticed initially. The involvement of the Internet service providers WP) is very limited, and changes to the infmtructure and operation rquim3 to deploy DPM a~ rrrrrrrmaL DPM performs the traceback without revealing the internal topology of the provider's network, which is a desirable quality of a traceback scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION In recent years much interest and consideration has been
paid to the topic of securing the Internet infrastructure that continues to become a medium for a broad range of transactions. A number of approaches to security have been proposed, each attempting to mitigate a specific set of concerns. After several high-profile Distributed Denial of Service @DOS) attacks on major US web sites in 2000, numerous IP naceback approaches have been suggested to identify the attacker@) [I] . The previously proposed schemes can be categorized in two broad groups. One group of the solutions relies on the routers in the network to send their identities to the destinations of certain packets, either encoding this information directly in rarely used bits of the IP header, or by generating a new packet to the same destination. The biggest limitation of this type of solutions is that they are focused only on flood-based DOS and DDoS attacks, and cannot handle attacks comprised of a small number of packets. Additionally, for the large scale DDoS attacks, these schemes are not very effective [Z]. [I] . The second group 'of solutions involves centralized management, and logging of packet information on the network. Solutions of this type introduce a large overhead, and are complex and not scalable.
In this article, Deterministic Packet Marking (DPM), a new approach to IP m e b a c k , is introduced. Even though DPM is classified as a scheme of the first type, the substantial differences of having only edge routers perform the marking allow DPM to perform traceback with only a few packets from the attacker and be capable of tracing thousands of . .
attackers simultaneously. The rest of the paper is structured in the following way: Section Il introduces the principle of D P M Section III describes the limitation of the basic DPM associated with tracing multiple attackers simultaneously; Section IV explains the main principle in dealing with multiple simultaneous attackers and other instances of source address inconsistency; Section V introduces and analyzes the performance of a modification to DPM that enables the traceback of simultaneous attackers; Section VI presents the conclusion.
BASIC DETERMINISTIC PACKET MARKING (DPM)
The basic DPM is a packet marking algorithm, which was first introduced in [3] . This section provides the general principle behind DPM and discusses the most basic implementation of the proposed scheme.
A. Assumptiom [4] . The two key assumptions driving this effort are:
Routers are both CPU and memory limited
The assumptions in this section were largely borrowed from An attacker may generate any packet B. DPM Principle As mentioned above, DPM is a packet marking algorithm. The 16-bit Packet ID field and I-bit Reserved Flag (RF) in the IP header will be used to mark packets. Each packet is marked when it enters the' network. This mark remains unchanged for as long as the packet traverses the network.
The packet is marked by the interface closest to the source of the packet on an edge ingress router, as seen in Figure 1 .
The mark is a partial address information of this interface, and will be addressed later in Section II-C. The interface makes a distinction between incoming and outgoing packets. Incoming packets are marked; outgoing packets are not marked. This ensures that the egress router will not overwrite the mark in a packet placed by an ingress router.
For illustrative purposes. assume that the Internet is a network with a single administration. In this case. only interfaces closest to the customers on the edge routers will participate in packet marking. Every incoming packet will be marked.
Should an attacker attempt to spwf the mark in order to deceive the victim, this spoofed mark will be overwritten with a correct mark by the very first router the packet traverses. carry the whole IP address in the available 17 bits. Therefore, it will take at least two packets to transport the whole IP address. An IP address will be split into two segments. 16 bits each segment 0 -bits 0 through 15, and segment 1 -bit+ 16 through 31. W i t h probability of 0.5, the ID field of each incoming packet will be populated with either of those two segments, and then the remaining bit, designated to be a segment number, will be set to the number of the segment in the mark.
At the victim, we suggest that the table matching the source addresses to the ingress addresses is maintained. When a marked packet arrives to the victim, the victim will first determine if the given packet is an attack packet. If it is, the. victim would check to see if the table enay for a source5 address of this packet already exists, and create it if it did not: Then, it would write the segment from the mark, according to the value of the segment number, into the ingress IP address value. After both segments corresponding to the same ingress address have arrived to the destination, the ingress address for a given source address h o m e s available to the victim.
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE BASIC DPM WITH RESPECT TO DDOS AITACKS
The problem with the basic DPM. which causes the inability to handle a certain type of DDoS attacks, lies in the fact that the destination would associate segments of the ingress address with the source address of the attacker. If it could be guaranteed that only one host participating in the attack has a given source address, even though it might have been spoofed, and that the attacker would not change its address during the attack, there would be no probkms. There are two situations when the reconstmction procedure of the basic DPM will fail. First, consider the situation when two hosts with the same Source Address (SA) attack the victim. The ingress addresses corresponding to these two attackers are A typical metric of evaluation of the traceback schemes for DDoS attacks is the rare of false positives or false posirive mre. In the context of DPM, a false positive is defined as an incorrectly identified ingress address. The rate of false positives refers to the ratio of the incorrectly identified ingress addresses to the total number of identified ingress addresses.
In the example described above, the. false positive rate for that particular attack is 50%. Clearly, the false positive rate would increase even funher if.the number of attackers, with the same SA, was larger.
Second, consider a @)DOS attack, where the attackers change their source addresses for every packet they send. The basic DPM will be unable to reconstruct any valid ingress addresses, since none of the enaies in the IngressTbl would have a complete ingress address.
IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF HANDLING DDOS ATTACKS
A general principle. in handling (D)DoS attacks of these types is to rely only on the information transferred in the DPM mark. The DPM Mark can be used to not only transfer the bits of the ingress address but also some other information. This additional information should enable the destination to determine which ingress address segments belong to which ingress address.
The reconstruction procedure utilizes the data stmcture called Reconstruction Table (RecTbl) . The destination would first put the address segments in RecTbl, and then only after correctly identifying~the ingress address, out of many possible address segments permutations, would transfer it to IngressTbl.
V. HASH-BASED DDOS MODIFICATION TO DPM
The scheme described in this section utilizes a hash function, H(z). To simplify the performance analysis, the hash function is assumed to be ideal. An ideal hash function minimizes the chances of collision, an occurrence when two different ingress addresses result in the same hash value.
In other words, H ( z ) is assumed to produce a collision only after all possible hash values have been produced. It is also assumed that the hash function is known to everybody, including all DPM-enabled interfaces, all destinations, which intend to utilize DPM marks for traceback, and the attackers. The constraint of 17 bits still remains, so a longer digest would result in fewer bits of the actual address transmitted in each mark, and consequently. the higher number of packets required for traceback.
A. Mark Encoding
Recall that in the basic DPM. the ingress address was divided in two segments. In this modified scheme, the ingress address is divided in li segments. Also, more bits would be required to identify the segment. Instead of a single bit required for two segments in the basic DPM, logz(k) would be required for this scheme. The remaining bits would be used for the digest. Independently of what segment of the address is being sent to the victim, the digest portion of the mark will always remain the same for a given DPM interface. This would enable the victim to associate the segments of the ingress address with each other to reconstruct the whole address. Figure 2 shows the schematics of the approach. The DPM mark consists of three fields: a-bit address bits field, d-bit digest field, and s-bit segment number field. Some padding may be required so that the address is split into segments with equal length. For example if the ingress address is divided in 5 segments, it would be necessary to pad it with '000' to make it 35-bit long.
I Fig. 2. Single Digest DDoS Modification
At startup the DPM-enabled interface prepares k marks for all segments of the address. A d-bit hash value, or digest, of the ingress address is calculated once and then inserted in the digest field of every mark. Each of k marks will have address bits set to a different segment of the ingress address.
The segment number field will be set to the appropriate value. These operations are shown to the left of the bold dotted line in Figure 2 . The processing required for every packet will be limited to generating a small random number from 0 to k -1 and insening a corresponding mark into the packet header.
B. Reconstruction by rhe K c m
The reconstruction procedure of this scheme will consist of two separate processes: Mark Recording and Ingress Address Recovery The reason for separating these two tasks is the fact that the attack packets may arrive to the destination faster than they can be analyzed. The mark recording process will set the appropriate bits in RecTbl to indicate which marks arrived to the destination. Address recovexy will check those bits and will compose address segment permutations and determine which ones are valid ingress addresses.
A reconstruction table RecTbl is a 2" bit structure, where every possible mark can be uniquely represented. It consists of Zd areas. Each area consists of k segments, and each segment consists of 2'L bits. Figure 3 shows an example of RecTbl.
where k, d, and a are 16, I 1 and 2. respectively. When a mark becomes available to the mark recording process. it sets the appropriate bit in the RecTbl. An ingress address can possibly hash into 2d digest values. The digest is extracted from the mark and the area where the bit will be set is determined. The segment number field in the mark indicates the segment in the RecTbl area, where the appropriate bit would be set. Finally, the value of the address bits in the mark indicates the actual bit, which will be set to '1'. This process is repeated for every mark.
The address recovery process will analyze each area of the RecTbl. Once again, it runs independently from the mark recording process, which allows post-monem traceback. The value of a certain bit in RecTbl indicates if the the corresponding mark arrived to the victim. For example, bit 2 in segment 6 of area 257 set to '1' means that there is an ingress address of interest, with digest of 257 having segment 6 equal to ' I O 2 as shown in Figure 3 . This segment has to be combined with other segments of this area in order to create permutations of segments. Hash function, H ( z ) , is applied to each of these permutations. If the result matches the area number, which is actually the digest, embedded in the marks (in this example 257), then the recovery process concludes that this permutation of segments is in fact a valid ingress address.
The address recovery process is an infinite loop, which starts from area 0 and performs identical processing for all areas. In every arm, it would first look at segment 0, bit 0. If this bit is set to 'I,, the process will conclude that a potential address has segment with address bits '00'2 in segment 0. The process will then examine segment 1 of this area If, for example, bits 1 and 3 e. both set to '1' in this segment, then it is concluded that the potential ingress address has '01'2 or 'I 1'2 in segment I . Therefore, there are two permutations of the first two segments, which are potentially the first two segments of a valid ingress address: '0001'~ and '001 1'2. The process moves on to the other segments in this area of RecTbl. The address recovery process has to go through all permutations within a given area before moving on to another area. H ( s ) is applied to every permutation, and only if the result matches the area number, the permutation is transferred to the IngressTbl.
C. Analysis
In this section, the number of attackers, which this hashbased modified scheme can traceback, with the false positive rate limited to I%, is evaluated. Let us examine the origin of false positives. If there is only one ingress address with a given digest, there will be no false positives because of the properties of the assumed ideal hash functions. Therefore, the rate of fdse positives is 0 when the number of attackers, N . is less or equal to the number of possible digests. This number has to be less than 1% of N . Therefore the following inequality has to be solved for N:
Recall that a and d can be expressed in terms of k. The maximum N , which would satisfy this inequality, N M A X . is very difficult to express in terms of k. However, it is possible to find N M A X by substitution. Another important consideration is the expected number of datagrams required for the reconstruction. This number will be related to k, the number of segments that the ingress address was split. The larger the k, the more different packets it would be required for the victim to receive in order to reconstruct the ingress address. The expected number of datagrams. E [D] . required to be marked by a single DPM-enabled interface in order for the victim to be able to reconstruct its ingress address is given by a Coupon Collector problem discussed in [5]:
+...+ 1 1 1 Table I provides the summary of these parameters. VI. CONCLUSION In this article, we have presented the modification to the basic DPM scheme introduced in 
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